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Myanmar: Now a Site for  
Sino–US Geopolitical Competition?
Jürgen Haacke
After the suppression of political protests in 1988, the Unites States’ Burma policy was primarily focused on the restoration of democracy and support for Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD). The strong anti-regime thrust of this policy 
meant that until 2011, when the ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC; previously known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC) 
handed over power to a nominally civilian government, Washington consistently ostracised 
Myanmar in international society. Moreover, the US systematically applied unilateral, broad-
based sanctions, and persistently called for a genuine dialogue with the political opposition 
that would ultimately lead to a transfer of power. Very much influenced and buttressed by 
a network of exiled Burmese dissidents and solidarity organisations, various human rights 
and pro-democracy groups, as well as overwhelming support in both houses of Congress, US 
policy nevertheless failed to force Myanmar’s leadership to compromise, let alone abandon 
their own political roadmap, as initiated in 2003. In the face of considerable US pressure, 
Naypyidaw relied above all on China for diplomatic protection at the UN Security Council, as 
well as financial assistance and expertise for limited economic development. 
In 2009, the incoming Obama administration initiated a comprehensive policy review of US Burma 
policy that led to the adoption of a more pragmatic, yet still ‘principled’ policy of engagement vis-à-vis 
Naypyidaw. The principal policy change concerned the adoption of a senior-level dialogue alongside existing 
sanctions. For almost two years though the policy shift failed to produce major results, notwithstanding 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest during this time. However, within months of former 
Prime Minister U Thein Sein becoming the first President under the 2008 Constitution in late March 
2011, the careful rapprochement between Washington and Naypyidaw, started two years earlier, soon 
paved the way for warmer bilateral relations. This happened when, from mid-2011 onwards, the new 
nominally civilian government opted to embark on a process of national reconciliation that in many ways 
satisfied American demands and hopes for such a process.
Interestingly, at a time when US policy toward Southeast Asia is widely seen to be underpinned by 
concerns regarding the People’s Republic of China, the Obama administration suggested that its more 
pragmatic policy toward Myanmar was fundamentally about supporting democracy and human rights 
as well as stability and greater prosperity in Burma, rather than being about China. As Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton put it: 
‘... we are not about opposing any other country; we’re about supporting this country [Myanmar]…
as I specifically told the president and the two speakers, we welcome positive, constructive 
relations between China and her neighbours…So from our perspective, we are not viewing this 
in light of any competition with China.’1 
 
1  Hillary Rodham Clinton, Press Availability in Nay Pyi Taw, 1 December 2011, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/177994.htm
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While taking seriously the declaratory objectives of US Burma policy, this short paper will examine in what 
ways Myanmar nevertheless is already becoming a potentially significant site for Sino-US geopolitical 
competition in Southeast Asia. It will do this in three steps. First, it will assess whether it is plausible that the 
declared goals fully capture the rationale underpinning US Burma policy, given its broader regional policy and 
strategy. Second, the paper will briefly explore China’s ambitions in Myanmar, as well as Beijing’s reaction to 
Washington’s efforts to normalise and deepen relations with Naypyidaw. Finally, the paper discusses both 
in what ways Naypyidaw’s rapprochement with Washington fits the historical pattern of Myanmar foreign 
policy, and what this means for Myanmar’s management of Sino-US competition. 
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S BURMA POLICY
The democratisation of Myanmar has constituted an important US policy objective for all recent U.S 
administrations. However, the embrace of pragmatic engagement in 2009 was an acknowledgement by the 
Obama administration that relying solely on sanctions in pursuit of political reforms and change in Myanmar 
made for a poor and failed strategy, and that better foreign policy instruments were available to the US 
to achieve this goal. Under Obama, dialogue thus became an important complement to sanctions. State 
Department officials in particular have played an important role both in the lead up to and since the initiation 
of the political process involving the new Myanmar government and Aung San Suu Kyi. These officials have 
communicated to Naypyidaw US expectations of the necessary steps and reform measures to advance the 
bilateral relationship. They have also closely interacted with Suu Kyi regarding political developments and her 
possible options in the context of political transition and the generational change at the top of Myanmar’s 
(ex)-military leadership. US officials as such also seem to have played a key part in Suu Kyi’s reassessment of 
how to approach those former military leaders now at the helm of the new civilian government. Similarly, 
US officials have discussed both with the government and ethnic groups the issue of national reconciliation. 
Beyond the goal of promoting political freedoms and democratic governance in Myanmar, the adoption of 
a more pragmatic Burma policy also served other objectives. One was the strengthening of US relations with 
ASEAN. Although the George W. Bush administration had not overlooked Southeast Asia, Washington was 
soon primarily preoccupied with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to the perceived detriment of its ASEAN 
ties. Bush’s critics within the US had pointed to significant long-term policy drift that put at risk American 
economic, political and security interests, and called for a comprehensive ASEAN strategy that recognised both 
Southeast Asia’s interest in global free trade and its important role in structuring regional security dialogues. 
The Obama policy team had also appreciated that President Bush’s hard-edged Burma policy had to some 
degree complicated relations with the Association as a whole because Washington had applied pressure on 
ASEAN countries to advance political change in Myanmar. Though promoting such change was to some extent 
shared by regional countries, ASEAN governments generally thought that a policy focused on sanctions and 
ostracism was counterproductive. They preferred economic and diplomatic engagement. Worrying though 
from a Southeast Asia perspective was that Washington seemed prepared to hold the further development 
of ties with ASEAN hostage to the situation in Myanmar. Such perceptions and assessments, not least those 
from within ASEAN, required a response. The review of US Burma policy and Washington’s decision to embark 
on a more pragmatic approach can thus be seen as part of an attempt not only to be effective in bilateral 
relations with Myanmar, but also to refashion US ties with ASEAN. When the policy adaption was announced, 
ASEAN countries welcomed it. 
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The Obama administration’s focus on strengthening ties with ASEAN as an organisation, as well as with its 
member-states cannot, however, really be considered outside the context of China’s rise as a great power 
and its deepening ties with Southeast Asia. China’s relations with the ASEAN states had greatly improved on 
the back of the China-ASEAN free-trade agreement and Beijing’s offer of Chinese aid, especially to countries 
in continental Southeast Asia, not least Myanmar.2 It seemed that even countries such as the Philippines and 
Indonesia were susceptible to China’s charm offensive and associated economic carrots. When the East Asia 
Summit, organised and nominally led by ASEAN, held its inaugural leaders’ meeting in 2005, Washington 
was excluded, much to its concern.
To be sure, the United States has for some time generally welcomed China’s growing stature and weight. 
However, Washington has also been concerned about China’s growing military capabilities and it has sought 
to influence China’s foreign policy choices by shaping the latter’s regional environment, not least by revitalising 
relations with alliance partners and friendly states. The Bush administration suggested in 2005 that China 
should become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in regional and international society, while simultaneously hedging 
against the possibility that Beijing would not. The Obama administration advanced a similar official position 
vis-a-vis China by emphasising the need for ‘strategic reassurance’, while continuing a dual strategy of 
engagement and balancing.3
The Obama administration has not only been prepared to counter and offset China’s earlier charm offensive in 
Southeast Asia, but also to confront, for instance, what has been perceived as renewed Chinese assertiveness 
in the South China Sea. This has involved emphasising the importance of the freedom of navigation and 
diplomatically challenging Beijing regarding its actions and claims in the South China Sea. In November 2011, 
for instance, Hillary Clinton made clear that while Washington did not take a position on any territorial claim, 
the claimants should not resort to intimidation or coercion to pursue the latter.4 That month, the United States 
also announced the deployment of a rotating contingent of 2,500 troops to Darwin, Australia.
Notably, the Obama administration continues to argue that it wants a ‘strong progressive partnership’ with Beijing, 
while asserting that the US is ‘destined to play a strong critical, primary role in the Asia Pacific region for decades to 
come’.5 To secure America’s leadership role in the Asia-Pacific, the administration has identified six lines of action: 
 
 
 
 
These lines of action all form part of what has been referred to as Obama’s ‘pivot’ towards the Asia-Pacific. 
In substantive terms, this involves, for instance, promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership and joining the East 
Asia Summit. However, what Hillary Clinton called ‘forward-deployed diplomacy’ aims to make use of the 
full range of US diplomatic resources to ‘every country and corner of the region’.6 These diplomatic efforts 
to advance the security and prosperity of the region are underpinned by the US military’s ‘rebalancing’ 
 
2  See Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport, CONN: Praeger Security International, 2007), 
Robert G.Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). 
3  As Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg put it in October 2009, ‘China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global 
role will not come at the expense of the security and well-being of others.’ 
4  Paul Eckert and Manuel Mogato, ‘Clinton warns against intimidation in South China Sea’, Reuters, 16 November 2011, www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/
us-philippines-clinton-idUSTRE7AF0JZ20111116
5  Kurt M. Campbell, ‘US Engagement in Asia’, Remarks at the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 10 October 
2011. 
6  Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Remarks at the East-West Center, Honolulu, 10 November 2011. 
1. Strengthening bilateral security alliances;
2. Deepening US working relationships with emerging powers; 
3. Engaging with regional multilateral institutions; 
4. Expanding trade and investment; 
5. Forging a broad-based military presence; 
6. Advancing democracy and human rights. 
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towards the region.7 Put differently, the US military is tasked to back principles of open and free commerce, the rule 
of law, open access by all to their shared domains of sea, air, space, and cyberspace, and resolving disputes 
without coercion or the use of force. To achieve this task Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has announced 
‘a sustained series of investments and strategic decisions to strengthen our military capabilities in the Asia 
Pacific region’.8 
Obama administration officials may insist that their goal is to improve ‘strategic trust’ between China and 
the United States. However, it is difficult to conclude that there is not a significant lack of trust that is very 
difficult for both sides to overcome. Chinese analysts increasingly see Washington moving beyond strategic 
ambiguity to embracing a containment strategy.9 
Given this broader context of US-China relations, the United States’ new Burma policy remains geared to 
the promotion of democratic governance and national reconciliation, but under President Obama it has 
arguably from the start also been made with China very much in mind. Statements regarding Myanmar 
initially made by administration officials may not always fully acknowledge this, given the significant and 
longstanding bipartisan support for regime change in Burma. However, the larger strategy outlined by the 
Obama administration supports this assessment. Also, it is useful to recall, for instance, that Assistant Secretary 
of State Kurt Campbell, who has been personally very much involved in leading the shift in Washington’s 
approach toward Myanmar, not only focused extensively on China’s rise and the balance of power in Asia 
before joining the administration, but has also been at the very heart of recalibrating US strategy toward 
the region. Similarly Ambassador Derek Mitchell, who in 2011 became the special representative and policy 
coordinator for Burma and then took up the long vacant post of US ambassador to Burma, may have had a 
longstanding interest in Myanmar, but he also remains known for his very significant expertise and contributions 
on developing strategy toward Southeast Asia and the wider East Asia-Pacific. 
 
CHINA’S MYANMAR POLICY 
In the context of Deng Xiaoping’s twin policies of reform and opening up to the outside world, Chinese 
policy advisors were emphasising the significance of Myanmar’s geographical position by the early to mid-
1980s. However, it was not until the beginning of this century that major infrastructure projects, such as 
the future oil and gas pipelines traversing Myanmar, were agreed. Today, Chinese SOEs are heavily invested 
in Myanmar’s natural resource sector. Politically, China’s government continues to celebrate its longstanding 
‘paukphaw’ (kinship) relationship with Myanmar that was first formed in the 1950s, while Chinese leaders 
have generally appreciated the entrenched sense of nationalism among Myanmar’s military leadership and 
its preference for foreign policy diversification. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Chinese analysts working on Southeast Asia and Myanmar thus immediately 
understood that the 2009 US Burma policy review alone might be understood in Naypyidaw as an opportunity 
to open up new diplomatic space for decision-makers. China’s government actually welcomed the Obama 
administration’s pragmatic engagement policy; earlier, China had itself facilitated an unsuccessful dialogue 
meeting between Myanmar and US officials in 2007. However, more recent developments, not least the US’ 
role in Myanmar’s dramatic embrace of political and economic reforms, and the Thein Sein government’s rapidly 
improving ties with the Obama administration, would seem to have left Beijing both startled and concerned.
 
 
7  See US Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012. 
8  Leon Panetta, ‘The US Rebalance Towards the Asia-Pacific’, 11th IISS Asian Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue), 2 June 2012. 
9  Lanxian Xiang, ‘China and the ‘Pivot’, Survival 54 (5) 2012, p.117. 
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During the decades in which various US administrations sought to break the military regime’s political will, 
China had emerged as Myanmar’s largest foreign investor, a key trading partner, and a very significant 
source of finance and expertise. The outcome of the US Burma policy review in September 2009 did not 
immediately threaten to alter the contours of this structural position, just as it did not immediately engender 
a fundamentally different relationship between Naypyidaw and Washington. Arguably, Chinese decision-
makers were content to see that while the SPDC was in power the new US Burma policy had little effect on 
either Myanmar’s relations with Washington or the domestic politics of Myanmar itself. 
China’s government apparently expected this state of affairs to continue even after the transition in late 
March 2011 to a nominally civilian government, despite Suu Kyi’s release the previous November and ongoing 
international clamour for political change. Indeed, the overwhelming victory of the USDP in the problematic and 
much criticised 2010 elections followed by the transfer of power to a younger generation of former military 
leaders, which saw long-serving Prime Minister Thein Sein become Myanmar’s new President, seem to have 
led China’s government to initially believe that the new government in Naypyidaw would not significantly 
deviate from longstanding SPDC positions, not least on national reconciliation and political reforms. With an 
elected and hence arguably more legitimate government in place, China itself pushed for a comprehensive 
strategic cooperative partnership, which was formally agreed during U Thein Sein’s first visit as President to 
Beijing in May 2011.
From Beijing’s perspective, such a partnership would build on and reinforce its existing economic and political 
relationship with Naypyidaw. In 2006-7 China provided Naypyidaw with important diplomatic protection, as 
Washington and London claimed that Myanmar posed a threat to regional peace and stability. This culminated 
in the China-Russia double veto in January 2007 of a draft resolution introduced by Washington and London 
at the UN Security Council. China itself became subject to considerable US diplomatic pressure following the 
veto. Yet rather than acquiesce to American calls for sanctions or add to international pressure for regime 
change, Beijing went no further than favouring an acceleration of the military’s own political roadmap to 
democracy. This support for the military government reflected China’s abiding interest in Myanmar’s political 
stability. There were also specific interests, both for Yunnan – China’s southern province that borders Myanmar 
– and Beijing, including border security, the safety of Chinese investments, and the construction and future 
operation of dual gas and oil pipelines from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan.
Moreover, at one level, China’s push for a comprehensive strategic partnership was not that remarkable because 
Beijing had already agreed similar partnerships with numerous other countries both within Southeast Asia and 
beyond. However, active bilateral diplomacy conducted in this context revealed a significant interest among 
Chinese political and military leaders in expanding the limited military cooperation that has characterised 
Sino-Myanmar relations to date. China’s desire for greater military cooperation seemingly was rooted in its 
strategic interest in access to the Bay of Bengal, in the context of Beijing’s apparent longer-term objective to 
develop a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. A plan of action to implement the partnership was endorsed 
by foreign ministers Jian Jiechi and U Wunna Maung Lwin in July 2011. What specific new forms of military 
cooperation, if any, have been agreed is not clear. 
Indeed, following President U Thein Sein’s visit to Beijing in May 2011, Chinese decision-makers soon enough 
found bilateral ties exposed to new political currents within Myanmar as President U Thein Sein suspended the 
massive Myitsone hydropower project in Kachin State in late September, which the China Power Investment 
Corporation had been constructing since late 2009. This decision was ostensibly taken in response to 
widespread domestic opposition reportedly also supported by Aung San Suu Kyi. In Western countries the 
suspension was mostly understood as a symbolic move against overbearing Chinese influence. For Beijing the 
58
decision arguably raised questions about its relations 
with Myanmar more generally and the implications 
for this and other Chinese investments in Myanmar 
more specifically.
The pace of improvements in US-Myanmar relations 
since August 2011 has exceeded most expectations, 
and both Washington and Naypyidaw were moved to 
reassure Chinese officials when Secretary Clinton visited 
Myanmar in December that year. Since then, however, 
US-Myanmar ties have continued on their upward 
trajectory as highlighted by President U Thein Sein’s 
visit to the US in September 2012. 
The Chinese government may voice understanding 
for Myanmar’s efforts to diversify its international 
partners, but nevertheless will find any move 
towards possible alignment between Washington 
and Naypyidaw difficult to accept in practice. Yet over 
time limited alignment is likely to be sought by the 
United States; certainly the Obama administration’s 
aim is for Washington to forge a better relationship 
with Myanmar than it currently enjoys with Vietnam. 
Many in China thus see the change in US Burma 
policy as part of a larger effort to encircle and contain 
China. From Beijing’s point of view, the changes in 
bilateral relations to date probably already imply that 
the scope of China’s future cooperative relationship 
with Myanmar could be more limited than previously 
expected: political-military cooperation represents the 
area most likely affected, but normalised relations 
with Washington will of course also allow Myanmar 
to seek alternative sources of capital and expertise 
from international financial institutions, Japan and 
Western countries. 
With America keen to deepen its warming ties with 
Myanmar, China’s government has openly stated its 
expectations pertaining to Naypyidaw’s future foreign 
policy orientation. For instance, in talks with former 
Vice President U Tin Aung Myint Oo, State Councillor 
Dai Bingguo declared China’s interest in a ‘peaceful, 
stable, independent and prosperous Myanmar’. 
Chinese leaders have also called for strengthening 
strategic trust between the two countries, as well as 
improved coordination and cooperation. Some have 
even proposed the consolidation of ties between the 
Communist Party of China and Myanmar’s Union 
Solidarity and Development Party. 
Beyond such rhetoric, China has also sought to take 
concrete steps to rebuild confidence and reinforce 
its relations with Naypyidaw. For instance, Chinese 
interlocutors have continued to facilitate dialogue 
between the government and some armed ethnic 
groups. China’s recent response to Kachin refugees 
seeking refuge along and across its border was also 
more measured than some might have expected 
given its previous reaction to the military and political 
decapitation of former Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng 
in 2009. Not surprisingly, China’s government has 
unambiguously voiced support for Myanmar’s 
economic reforms and development goals. When 
the United States and Europe were debating how 
and when to dismantle sanctions imposed against the 
SPDC, Beijing pointedly reiterated its call on Western 
countries to lift sanctions to promote stability and 
development in Myanmar. Also around this time, 
in New York, Beijing proposed that the Myanmar 
‘Group of Friends’ at the UN assume a more practical 
role to bolster the country’s economic development. 
These positions and initiatives suggest that PRC 
decision-makers are loathe to cede political ground 
to Washington,, attesting to a competitive dynamic at 
play. How is this competition likely to affect Myanmar’s 
foreign policy?
 
MYANMAR FOREIgN POLICY
Historically, Myanmar’s political leaders have pursued 
a nonaligned foreign policy to manage the complex 
mix of external and internal political-security pressures 
that the country has confronted since independence. 
Despite this nonalignment, China has always had a 
special place in Myanmar foreign policy, which to 
some extent has found expression in emphasis on the 
kinship or ‘paukphaw’ character of their relationship, 
and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. While 
China presented a multifaceted challenge for Burma 
during the SLORC/SPDC years, Naypyidaw was able 
to rely on the People’s Republic for diplomatic support 
and protection, especially when the United States 
sought to exert concerted multilateral pressure at the 
UNSC. Yet even during this period, however, Myanmar 
formally pursued a nonaligned foreign policy, and at 
most entertained with Beijing what might be called 
limited alignment in practice. 
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While taking advantage of Beijing’s diplomatic cover, the increasing economic dependence on China in 
the face of Western sanctions was becoming a major concern for Myanmar’s nationalist military leaders. 
Veteran Burma analyst Bertil Lintner has repeatedly stressed that an internal study of Myanmar-US relations 
calling for improvements in bilateral relations to alleviate the potential costs of Myanmar’s reliance 
on China conducted by Naypyidaw as early as 2004.10 In the event, the top military leadership clearly found it 
difficult to balance ties with China by building a better relationship with the United States for as long as the 
George W. Bush administration was in power, although the SPDC’s interest in a dialogue with Washington 
was communicated both before and after the completion of its political roadmap in September 2007. Only 
with the Obama administration undertaking a review of Burma policy did a promising opportunity for a 
constructive new relationship with the US emerge. 
Warmer ties with the United States are bound to yield many positives. American investments in Myanmar 
are now again possible, which should contribute at minimum to the creation of some new jobs; important 
in this regard is also the opportunity for Myanmar-based producers to export again to the US. Moreover, 
Myanmar’s evolving relationship with Washington is bound to result in the renewal of educational and 
institutional capacities, as well as social capital. Bilateral and wider international assistance to deal with urgent 
humanitarian and development issues within the country will also become available. This, in turn, should 
make it more likely, for instance, for the Thein Sein government to successfully address not least the complex 
emergency that has characterised the country for long. 
The new relationship with Washington has not only served to help legitimise the incumbent government, 
but also allowed Myanmar leaders to cast aside representations of the country as a pariah state in regional 
and international society. It has also made possible the wider rebalancing of Myanmar’s external relations. 
Countries that were erstwhile persuaded or pressured by Washington to play hardball with the military 
government have been able to reconsider their position toward Naypyidaw. Quite striking, for instance, is 
Japan’s planned level of future economic engagement, which would have been impossible during SPDC rule, 
but which the Thein Sein government has successfully encouraged. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s fellow members 
in ASEAN are keen for Naypyidaw to reinforce Southeast Asian regionalism, whereas before Myanmar was 
collectively criticised and at times isolated. Clearly, Myanmar sees ASEAN as having a very important political 
function, underlined by its application to assume the Association’s chairmanship in 2014. Regarding new 
avenues of military cooperation, Myanmar seems destined to attend as an observer the forthcoming Cobra 
Gold exercise, the largest multilateral exercise the United States conducts in the Asia-Pacific region. Organised 
in Thailand on an annual basis, Cobra Gold involves several other participating countries from Southeast and 
East Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Japan. 
Notwithstanding these developments, it is difficult to envisage Myanmar breaking anytime soon with a 
key pillar of its foreign policy, namely the principle of nonalignment. The rebalancing of Myanmar’s foreign 
relationships to date seems entirely compatible with contemporary practices of nonalignment. The reform 
policies enacted hence are unlikely to mean that China will no longer have a special place in Myanmar 
diplomacy. After all, China is an established cooperative partner and a direct neighbour. Burning bridges with 
China is thus not in Naypyidaw’s interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
10  See, for instance, Bertil Lintner, ‘Realpolitik and the Myanmar Spring’, Foreign Policy, 30 November 2011, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/30/
democracy_myanmar [accessed 2 December 2011]. The study was authored by Lt Col Aung Kyaw Hla at the Myanmar Defense Services Academy. 
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Also, it seems likely that at least the government of President U Thein Sein will not want to be too beholden 
to Washington, just as it does not want to be too beholden to Beijing. Indeed, the opening to America is 
not devoid of its own challenges. The odd piece of anecdotal evidence suggests that some of Myanmar’s 
officials feel that Washington is pushing rather hard even at this stage for new forms of bilateral cooperation. 
What remains to be seen is whether long-held memories and suspicions of the United States have already 
dissipated across the political and military leadership. 
So far, warmer ties with the US have hinged on President Thein Sein following through not only with the 
necessary steps and concessions that have allowed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to rejoin and legitimise the political 
process started under the SLORC/SPDC, but also a series of other important steps, such as the release from 
prison of critics of the former military regime. Given the results of the 2012 by-elections, in which the NLD 
thrashed all other political parties, there remain questions about the political future of those who won office 
on the back of the problematic 2010 elections. It is also far from clear whether the constitutional changes to 
which Daw Suu Kyi aspires will be achievable before the 2015 elections. While the Obama administration has 
offered backing to President U Thein Sein’s government in support of his willingness to engage in reforms, 
American policy makers are bound to watch closely how Myanmar’s former generals will manage the process 
of political change over the next few years. 
CONCLUSION
As the Obama administration is keen to support Thein Sein’s dual project of political reconciliation and 
economic reforms, with China’s rise clearly in mind, the geopolitical competition over Myanmar between 
Washington and Beijing is set to intensify. The present US role in Myanmar’s political and economic reforms 
will in all likelihood lead in the future to a greatly expanded presence in the country. By comparison, China’s 
often much exaggerated political hold over Naypyidaw has taken a knock with US-Myanmar rapprochement. 
Its significant economic presence in Myanmar will continue, however. Significantly, far from pulling back, the 
Chinese leadership also seems eager to continue to boost the bilateral relationship with Naypyidaw, which 
will probably prompt more rounds of competition for greater influence between Beijing and Washington 
concerning Myanmar. 
By normalising relations with Washington, Naypyidaw will have gone some way to restoring the balance 
historically favoured in Myanmar’s external relations. To progress with its domestic reform agenda, the Thein 
Sein government seems committed both to warmer relations with Washington as well as pursuing the 
comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership it agreed with China. However, evidence suggests that the 
Thein Sein government knows it will need to carefully manage the attention and interest from both Beijing 
and Washington. 
Finally, one should not assume that developments in Myanmar over the next three years will necessarily 
amount to an entirely smooth political transition. So far the NLD has been the major beneficiary in party 
political terms from the present process of reconciliation long urged by Washington. With the political future 
of representatives and officials of the previous regime possibly in doubt, there is at least the question over 
how much internal pressure the President will yet face and be able to resist regarding a possible recalibration 
of the current political course and concessions in the name of national reconciliation. In turn, the resulting 
decisions of this process are likely to affect Nypyidaw’s relationship with Washington and Beijing. ■
 
